


































I compare the welfare implications of implementing Bismarckian and Beveridgean social
security systems.
In an overlapping generations environment with intragenerational homogeneity, agents can be
better o⁄ with a system with universal bene￿ts than with a comparable system with earnings-
dependent bene￿ts because the latter generates a stronger decrease in net wages. Once I
allow for intragenerational skill heterogeneity, agents are on average better o⁄ with the more
redistributive universal bene￿ts system.
I then let agents vote for the replacement rates in a democratic process. In the absence
of intragenerational heterogeneity, a larger social security system is implemented when bene-
￿ts are earnings-dependent than when they are universal resulting in a larger decrease in net
wages; this makes young agents worse o⁄ with earnings-dependent bene￿ts. In the presence of
intragenerational skill heterogeneity, the reverse occurs and agents fare on average better in the
long-run when bene￿ts are earnings-dependent. However, because of its redistributional e⁄ects,
agents born at the time of implementation are on average better o⁄ with an universal bene￿ts
system.
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11 Introduction
Social security systems are generally ￿nanced on a pay-as-you-go basis with taxes levied on the
labor income of workers ￿nancing the bene￿ts to retirees. These bene￿ts are typically of two types:
in a Beveridgean social security system bene￿ts are universal, in the sense that all retirees from the
same cohort are entitled to the same level of bene￿ts; in a Bismarckian system retirees￿bene￿ts
depend on their earnings history.
The two systems have distinct redistributional features and (in)e¢ ciency implications. In
a Beveridgean system retirees receive the same level of bene￿ts independently of their earnings
history. This implies some intragenerational redistribution from high to low income earners, as
high earners contribute signi￿cantly more than low earners and receive the same bene￿ts. In
opposition, a Bismarckian system where bene￿ts are proportional to earnings does not imply any
direct intragenerational redistribution. Moreover, by making bene￿ts dependent on earnings a
Bismarckian system can reduce the distortionary e⁄ect of social security taxation on the supply
of labor. This lays ground to the common perception that absent intragenerational inequities,
on average, agents are better o⁄ with a social security system with earnings-dependent bene￿ts, a
Bismarckian system, than with one with universal bene￿ts, a Beveridgean system. In fact, in their
seminal work, and, to my knowledge, the only work that presents a welfare comparison of the two
systems, Auerbach and Kotliko⁄ (1987) ￿nd e¢ ciency gains from establishing a link between an
agent￿ s contributions and bene￿ts in a standard overlapping generations model calibrated to match
the U.S. economy.
In this paper, I revisit the e⁄ectiveness of Bismarckian social security systems and Beveridgean
social security systems in redistributing resources across generations. I start by abstracting from
their intragenerational distributive features and study their welfare implications ￿rstly when the
parameters of the systems are given and then when agents choose the corresponding policy para-
meters. I then introduce intragenerational heterogeneity and re-evaluate the two systems.
I evaluate social security systems using an overlapping generations economy where a large
number of agents are ￿born￿each period and live for a maximum of four periods. The population
in this economy grows at a constant rate and individuals supply labor endogenously for the ￿rst
three periods of their lives and retire during the last period before dying. With a pay-as-you-go
social security system, the government levies a tax on labor income and uses the revenue to fund
2the bene￿ts of the retirees. I let bene￿ts either be proportional to the economy￿ s labor income, in
a Beveridgean system, or proportional to the recipient￿ s lifetime earnings, in a Bismarckian system.
I quantify the ￿ndings by calibrating the parameters of the economy and solving numerically for
the equilibrium paths for the economy under di⁄erent social security systems.
I ￿rst compare a social security system with universal bene￿ts to one with earnings-dependent
bene￿ts that provides the same level of bene￿ts. Surprisingly, when I abstract from the intragener-
ational distributional features of the systems1, I ￿nd that the current young and future generations
are better o⁄ in the economy with universal bene￿ts. If bene￿ts are earnings-dependent the link
between agents￿contributions and bene￿ts they receive upon retirement implies that the tax dis-
tortion is lower for any given level of social security bene￿ts. However, the reduction in the tax
distortion implies a much lower decrease in labor supply. The increase in the supply of labor with
the earnings-dependent bene￿ts system relatively to the supply of labor in a comparable universal
bene￿ts system rises with age. Consequently, the lifetime income pro￿le is relatively steeper and
young and middle-aged agents smooth their lifetime consumption pro￿les by saving less. Although
the oldest generation of workers saves relatively more with the earnings-dependent system in order
to consume more upon retirement, the resulting increase in their savings is smaller than the decrease
in the younger generations savings and the earnings-dependent bene￿ts system has a higher neg-
ative impact on aggregate savings than the universal bene￿ts system. So an earnings-dependent
bene￿ts system generates a higher supply of labor and lower accumulation of capital along the
equilibrium path than a comparable universal bene￿ts system. In general equilibrium, the dispar-
ity in the impact on the supply of labor and on capital accumulation implies that net wages are
signi￿cantly lower and, therefore, agents are worse o⁄ with an earnings-dependent bene￿ts system
than with a comparable universal bene￿ts system.
Once I allow for agents to di⁄er within each cohort according to their skill levels, the intra-
generational redistributive features of the Beveridgean system dominate and on average agents
fare better with an universal bene￿ts system than with a comparable earnings-dependent bene￿ts
system. While this is true both in partial and in general equilibrium, in the latter case the result-
ing decrease in wages diminishes the redistributive features of the universal bene￿ts system and
1An overlapping generations environment without intragenerational heterogeneity precludes the redistributive
feature of universal bene￿ts social security systems and predisposes the model to deliver results favorable to an
earnings-dependent bene￿ts system relatively to a comparable universal bene￿ts system.
3consequently its relative welfare advantage.
As I increase the exogenous social security tax rate, the reduction in tax distortions achieved
through earnings-dependency increases exponentially, and ends up o⁄setting the other e⁄ects, lead-
ing to welfare gains of the system with earnings dependent bene￿ts relatively to a comparable system
with universal bene￿ts.
I then construct a political economy model of social security, where agents vote for the pa-
rameters that determine the level of social security bene￿ts, to study the welfare implications of
implementing either a Bismarckian or a Beveridgean social security system. I ￿nd that, in the
absence of intragenerational heterogeneity, when voters choose social security parameters, the me-
dian voter prefers a signi￿cantly larger social security system when bene￿ts are earnings-dependent.
As in Cooley and Soares (1999), the general equilibrium e⁄ects are determinant. An earnings-
dependent bene￿ts system generates a higher supply of labor and lower accumulation of capital
along the equilibrium path than a comparable universal bene￿ts system. While the impact on
the initial period factor prices is very similar across systems, thereafter the interest rate increases
and the wage rate decreases signi￿cantly more with an earnings-dependent bene￿ts system. The
augmented impact on the interest rate generates the extra support for social security by the older
agents, that have accumulated capital, and the median voter is enticed to vote for a bigger social
security system when she is choosing over levels of earnings-dependent bene￿ts. As a result young
agents are worse o⁄, in the short-run and in the long-run, when bene￿ts are earnings-dependent
than when they are universal.
Finally, in an economy with intragenerational heterogeneity, the median voter prefers a larger
social security system when bene￿ts are universal. In the short-run less skilled agents who bene￿t
from the intragenerational redistribution generated by this system and some older more skilled
agents who gain from the larger intergenerational redistribution associated with a larger system
are better o⁄than with an earnings-dependent system. On average all cohorts are better o⁄in the
short-run with an universal bene￿ts system. However, in the long-run the larger size of the system
generates a stronger decrease in wages and results in increased welfare losses. Consequently, most
agents are worse o⁄ with an universal bene￿ts system in the long-run.
There is an extensive literature that studies the introduction of social security in the context
of majority voting in general equilibrium overlapping generations models. Previous work on the
4political economy of social security has focused on explaining the size of social security systems,
looking at the determination of the level of bene￿ts which, in general, have been assumed to be
universal (see Browning (1975), Boadway and Wildasin (1989), Cooley and Soares (1999), Tabellini
(2000) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) among others). Zhang and Zhang (2003) study the opti-
mality of earnings-dependent bene￿ts in an endogenous fertility model where they have a positive
impact on human capital accumulation and growth. Casamatta et al (2000a) study the choice of
the size of social security systems given the fraction of bene￿ts related to contributions, which is
chosen optimally in Casamatta et al (2000b). However, they assume that agents di⁄er in their
labor productivity but supply labor exogenously, therefore abstracting from one of the main points
of this paper. Cremer and Pestieau (1998) and Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) focus on the com-
position of the social security system; their objective is not to compare the welfare implications
of the two systems but to generate an equilibrium where both systems coexist. Koethenbuerger
et al. (2008), develop an analytical political economic model, where voters choose the size of the
social security system given the exogenous composition of the bene￿ts and show that as the relative
size of the earnings-dependent component increases, the size of the system increases. This paper
is di⁄erent from theirs in many dimensions. In the ￿rst place, Koethenbuerger et al (2008) do
not pursue a welfare analysis of the di⁄erent social security systems. Moreover, in sharp contrast
with the results of this paper, as they do not allow factor prices to change, they ￿nd that earnings-
dependent bene￿ts systems are more attractive for the median voter because of lower distortion in
labor supply and less intragenerational redistribution.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic environment. Section 3
presents the economic equilibria, describes the political decision process and the resulting politico-
economic equilibria. Section 4 calibrates the model while section 5 presents the ￿ndings. Section
6 provides a summary of the ￿ndings and section 7 concludes.
2 The Economic Environment
I study an economy where, in each period, a large number of heterogeneous agents with a lifetime
of four periods are born. The population size in period t is given by Nt and grows at the rate n.
The share of age i individuals in the population, given by the measure ￿i, i = 1;:::;4 is constant
over time and ￿i+1 = 1
1+n￿i; with
P4
i=1 ￿i = 1. Within each generation there are J types of agents
5that di⁄er according to their labor productivity, the share of type j agents in the population, ￿j,
is constant.
Agents in each generation maximize their discounted lifetime utility: for a type j agent born in




where ￿ is the discount factor, ci;j;t+i￿1 is consumption and li;j;t+i￿1 is leisure of an age i, type
j individual in period t + i ￿ 1.
The ￿momentary￿utility function is assumed to take the constant relative risk aversion form





where ￿ > 0; is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the
coe¢ cient of consumption on the Cobb-Douglas index.
The budget constraint facing an individual of age i and type j can be written as
ai+1;j;t+1 = (1 + rt)ai;j;t + yi;j;t ￿ ci;j;t, (3)
where ai;j;t denotes the asset holdings at the beginning of period t and rt denotes the rate of return
on these assets; yi;j;t is the real net labor income plus social security transfers of an age i, type
j individual in period t.
I assume that agents may work the ￿rst three periods of their lives, but must retire afterwards.
Before their mandatory retirement, age i, type j workers supply endogenously hi;j hours of labor
and have di⁄erent productivity levels represented by "i;j, an e¢ ciency index that quanti￿es the
productivity of an unit of work supplied by an agent of age i and type j. After retirement, workers
receive social security bene￿ts, bj;t. The level of bene￿ts can either be proportional to the average
labor income of the retiree, in a Bismarckian system, or independent of her past earnings and





￿te4;j;t, in a Bismarckian system,








is the average lifetime earnings of an age i, type j agent at time t and wh"t is the weighted average
earnings of the current working generations. The parameters ￿t and ￿t are the replacement rate
that determine the level of social security bene￿ts in each period for the Bismarckian and the
Beveridgean systems respectively.





(1 ￿ ￿ss;t)wthi;j;t"i;j, for i = 1;2;3,
bj;t; for i = 4.
(6)
where ￿ss;t is the social security tax rate on labor income.
The production technology of the economy is described by a constant-returns-to-scale function,
Yt = F(Kt;Lt) = K1￿￿
t L￿
t ; (7)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the labor share of output, Yt; and Kt and Lt are the capital and labor inputs.
The capital stock is equal to the aggregate asset holdings of agents in the economy. It depreciates
at a constant rate ￿ and evolves according to the law of motion,
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + It: (8)
There is a government in this economy that implements the pay-as-you-go social insurance
system. The government must impose taxes on labor income so that its budget is balanced each
period.
￿ss;t wtLt = Bt (9)
7where Bt is the level of total bene￿ts paid to retirees in period t.
3 Equilibrium
I ￿rst describe the individual economic problem faced by agents for a given sequence of political
parameters. I then describe how these parameters are determined and de￿ne a politico-economic
equilibrium for this economy.
3.1 Economic Decisions
Given a sequence of social security replacement rates and the corresponding tax rate, the economic
problem of an age i, type j individual is to choose a sequence of consumption, leisure and asset
holdings that maximize the discounted lifetime utility subject to her budget constraints. De￿ne
X and xi;j as vectors describing respectively the aggregate state of the economy and the individual
state of an agent. X = (A;E); where A and E represent the distributions of assets and of past
lifetime earnings across agents. xi;j = (ai;j;ei;j), where ai;j and ei;j represent the level of assets















(1 ￿ ￿(X;￿))W(X;￿)hi;j"i;j, for i = 1;2;3;
bj; for i = 4.
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Here, P (X;￿) is the law of motion of the distribution of capital and lifetime earnings, W(X;￿)
and R(X;￿) are the relative factor price functions and ￿(X;￿) is the social security tax rate
function. ￿ is a given sequence of replacement rates that describe the social security policy in
each period from the current period on, ￿ = f￿l;￿lg
1
l=t.
This problem generates a set of decision functions ci;j(xi;j;X;￿), hi;j(xi;j;X;￿), ai;j(xi;j;X;￿),
a law of motion P(X;￿), and value functions Vi;j(xi;j;X;￿):
In this economy, competitive ￿rms maximize pro￿ts taking the wage rate and interest rate as
given. The ￿rst-order conditions for the ￿rm￿ s problem determine the following functions for the
net real return to capital and the real wage rate:











The government levies taxes on labor income to balance its budget each period.
93.2 Political Decisions
In the political economy model of social security, I implement either a Bismarckian or a Beveridgean
social security system in an initial period. The corresponding replacement rate, ￿ or ￿; is chosen by
agents through a democratic voting process and it determines the level of social security bene￿ts
as described by equation (4). As in Cooley and Soares (1999), I restrict the set of possible
sequences of policy functions to be sequences of a constant policy parameter. Therefore agents in
the implementation period choose a social security system described by this constant parameter.
To abbreviate the analysis and focus on the choice of the social security parameters, I assume
that a social security system is chosen and implemented in an initial period and is maintained
henceforth2.
3.2.1 The political choice
In the initial period, period 1, agents choose the level of the policy parameter, ￿ = ￿ or ￿ = ￿,
that will be implemented.
The solution to an agent￿ s political problems involves evaluating the utility obtained under all
possible values for the policy parameter. This requires that the agent predicts the competitive
equilibrium path from the implementation period on for all alternative choices.





where X1 and xi;j;1 describe, respectively, the aggregate state of the economy and the individual
state of age i, type j agent in the implementation period.
In this setting, if the preferences over the possible parameters are single-peaked, there exists
a policy function, de￿ned by the choice of the median voter, that resists every set of proposals to
change, and thus constitutes a voting equilibrium.
Lemma 1: Let m denote the age and type of the median voter in the initial period of the
2This assumption could be rationalized by assuming that a social security is implemented together with a repu-
tational mechanism as in Cooley and Soares (1999). The reputational mechanism would imply that if workers vote
against paying social security bene￿ts, then agents next period loose con￿dence in the sustainability of the system.
This loss of credibility means the cost of defecting today involves the collapse of the system tomorrow.





De￿nition: A politico-economic equilibrium is a set of value functions, Vi;j(x;X;￿), decision rules
for consumption, individual labor supply and asset holding ci;j(x;X;￿), hi;j(x;X;￿), ai;j(x;X;￿),
8 i;j, a law of motion for the distribution of capital and lifetime earnings P(X;￿), the relative
factor price functions W(X;￿) and R(X;￿), the tax rate function ￿(X;￿), functions for the level
of capital K(X;￿) and for the e⁄ective labor supply L(X;￿) and a political outcome function
￿(X) such that these functions satisfy:
1. The individual￿ s dynamic program (10).
2. The ￿rst-order conditions of the ￿rm￿ s problem (11).
3. Factor markets clear:


















￿j [ci;j(x;X;￿) + ai;j(x;X;￿)] = F(K;L) + (1 ￿ ￿)K: (15)










6. The government budget is balanced.
117. The political outcome function is generated by the aggregation of the choices of agents fol-
lowing lemma 1.
4 Calibration
To solve this model numerically, I calibrate the parameters of the model so that the politico-
economic steady-state equilibrium of the economy with universal bene￿ts matches some long run
features of the U.S. economy. I assume that a period in the model corresponds to 15 years.
Agents in this model are assumed to be born at the age of 21 when they become full-time workers,
working 3 periods (45 years) and then retiring for the last period of their lives (15 years).
Population Growth Rate:
I match the annual population growth rate for the model to the average population growth rate
in the US economy in the last decades, 0:0124 (Citibase Data, 1946-1993). For the four generation
model this translates to a growth rate of n = 0:203.
Preferences
I choose the coe¢ cient of risk aversion ￿ and the value for the discount factor, ￿; so that the
equilibrium annual interest rate is approximately 6% and the equilibrium social security tax rate
is about 9:4%. I calibrate the coe¢ cient of consumption in the utility function, ￿, to 0:358 so that
on average agents in the labor force allocate around 31% of their time to market activities.
Technology
The share of labor in the production function and the annual depreciation rate are set to be
0:64 and 8% respectively, standard values in the literature.
Labor e¢ ciency units:
The age speci￿c endowments of e¢ ciency units are taken from Altig et al (2001). Using their
estimates, I di⁄erentiate agents according to their e¢ ciency levels, "i;j ordering twelve di⁄erent
12agent types from the less e¢ cient and poorer (type 1) to the more e¢ cient and richer (type 12).
Types 1 and 12 consist of 2 percent of the cohort each, types 2 and 11 include 8 percent apiece,
while each other type constitutes 10 percent of the cohort.
In order to allow a straightforward comparison of the results across economies and keep the
experiment simple, I assume that the age speci￿c endowments of e¢ ciency units for an agent in the
economy with intragenerational homogeneity correspond to the average endowment of his cohort
in the economy with intragenerational heterogeneity.
The parameter choices are summarized in Table 13.
5 Findings
I ￿rst compare a social security system with universal bene￿ts to one with earnings-dependent
bene￿ts while keeping the level of social security bene￿ts the same across systems. I start by
maintaining factor prices ￿xed and focus on partial equilibrium di⁄erences between the systems. I
then let prices adjust and study the contrast between the systems when general equilibrium e⁄ects
are allowed to play a role.
Finally, I compute the politico-economic equilibria where agents vote for the replacement rate
given one system or the other, and compare the welfare implications of implementing either a
universal bene￿ts or an earnings-dependent bene￿ts social security system.
5.1 Economic Equilibria
In this section I evaluate the welfare impacts of introducing comparable social security systems
with either earnings-dependent bene￿ts or universal bene￿ts.
I set the replacement rate of the social security system with universal bene￿ts (hereafter referred
to as the UB system) so that it delivers a tax rate of 9:4%, and choose the sequence of replacement
rates for the system with earnings-dependent bene￿ts (hereafter referred to as the EDB system)
such that social security bene￿ts are the same as with the UB system along the equilibrium path.4
3For the benchmark calibration the interest rate is 1:0196 per period while the population grows at a rate of 0:203
per period implying that the economy is dynamically e¢ cient.
4While there are many alternative criteria to compare social security systems, I chose to compare systems that
provide the same level of bene￿ts because an earnings-dependent bene￿t system is perceived as more e¢ cient. This
13In order to abstract from all pecuniary e⁄ects of social security, I ￿rst look at the partial
equilibrium e⁄ect of implementing social security. For this purpose, I set the wage and interest
rates to their equilibrium levels in the steady-state of the economy without social security. I then
take into account the pecuniary e⁄ect of social security by studying the general equilibrium where
factor prices are endogenous.
5.1.1 Intragenerational Homogeneity
Partial Equilibria: In the EDB system, the level of bene￿ts is proportional to an agent￿ s lifetime
labor income and workers account for the impact on their social security bene￿ts of an increase in
their labor income. The optimality condition for the labor supply decision is then:
hi;j;t : ul (ci;j;t;li;j;t) = wt "i;j
￿














is the impact of current labor supply on retirement bene￿ts in terms of current units of consumption.
This link between bene￿ts and earnings reduces the e⁄ective level of social security taxation. For
the same wage rate and social security tax rate, the relative cost of leisure in terms of consumption
is higher because of the impact of labor income on social security bene￿ts. Hence agents increase
consumption, and decrease leisure. This results in an increase in the supply of labor relatively
to the UB case. Moreover, because of the increase in labor supply the tax needed to ￿nance the
same level of bene￿ts is lower in the EDB system which further decreases the tax distortion. As
can be seen in ￿gure (1 panel c), a lower social security tax rate is needed to ￿nance the same level
of social security bene￿ts when bene￿ts are earnings-dependent. In ￿gure (1 panel b) it is clear
that the supply of labor is less negatively a⁄ected by social security when bene￿ts are earnings-
dependent. Notice also that, when bene￿ts are earnings-dependent, we observe a long-run increase
in the aggregate supply of labor relatively to the equilibrium without social security.
To some extent savings decreases by more in the earnings-dependent case (see ￿gure 1 panel
implies that it should provide the same level of bene￿ts at a lower cost, therefore generating lower welfare losses,
than an universal bene￿ts system. An alternative would be to compare systems with the same tax rate, however this
would imply di⁄erent levels of bene￿ts as well as di⁄erent contributions, making it more di¢ cult to compare the two
systems.
14a). The impact of an increase in labor on social security bene￿ts, ￿i;j;t, is higher as agents get
closer to their retirement. Therefore, the reduction in the e⁄ective level of social security taxation
and the corresponding raise in the cost of opportunity of leisure augment with an individual￿ s age.
Hence, the increase of the supply of labor relatively to the UB case rises with age (see ￿gure 2
panels a-c) and so does the increase in after tax labor income. As a result, the lifetime income
pro￿le becomes steeper and the young and the middle-aged reduce their savings to smooth their
lifetime consumption pro￿les (see ￿gure 2 panels d and e). Notice however that retirees￿assets are
higher in the EDB case (see ￿gure 2 panel f). In order to smooth the consumption-leisure bundle,
and although their leisure automatically goes up upon retirement, retirees want to consume more
than in the UB system because their lifetime resources are higher. Given that, by construction,
social security bene￿ts are identical across systems, agents want more assets upon retirement in
the EDB case. However, the resulting relative increase in retirees￿asset accumulation is smaller
than the decrease in younger agents￿savings and the EDB system has a stronger negative impact
on aggregate savings than the UB system.
More importantly, not only the present value of net bene￿ts and the after-tax wage rate are
higher under the EDB system because of the decrease in the tax rate, but the reduction in the tax
distortion reduces the corresponding deadweight loss. Consequently, the welfare of current and
future young is higher under the EDB system (see ￿gure 3).
I measure the welfare loss of an agent in a given equilibrium relatively to a reference equilibrium
as the ￿xed percentage increase in the lifetime consumption of the individual needed to equate
the level of welfare she would achieve in the reference equilibrium. I refer to this measure as
the compensating variation. Formally, if V R and V T denote the welfare levels in the reference







The compensating variation is positive (negative) if there is a welfare loss (gain) relatively to the
reference equilibrium. Table 2 presents the values of this measure for the di⁄erent experiments.
In the present analysis, for a young agent born at the time of implementation of social security,
we would have to decrease her lifetime consumption in the economy with the EDB system by 0:14%
for her to be as well o⁄ as with the implementation of the UB system. In the long-run, to make
15a young agent born in the steady-state of the economy with the EDB system as well o⁄ as if she
was born in the steady-state of the economy with the UB system, we would have to decrease her
lifetime consumption by 0:14%. As a reference, note that for the initial young to be as well o⁄
with the implementation of the UB system as in the steady-state without social security we would
need to increase her consumption by 3:96%.
General Equilibria: I now compare the impact of implementing the di⁄erent types of social
security systems in general equilibrium, choosing the sequence of replacement rates for the EDB
system so that social security bene￿ts are the same along the equilibrium paths.
The di⁄erence between the general equilibrium and the partial equilibrium paths stems from the
adjustment of factor prices and its feedback into agents￿decisions. As we observed in the partial
equilibrium analysis, the supply of labor is signi￿cantly higher and savings are slightly lower with
the EDB system. As a result of its impact on savings, the EDB system generates slightly lower
levels of capital (see ￿gure 4 panel a). Once we allow factor prices to respond, the decrease in
capital and increase in labor supply (see ￿gure 4 panel b) relatively to the UB equilibrium results
in a lower wages (see ￿gure 4 panel c). Even though the tax rate is lower with the EDB system
(see ￿gure 4 panel e), the response of the wage rate implies a lower after tax wage rate (see ￿gure
4 panel f). The decrease in after-tax wages makes the current young and future agents worse o⁄
with the EDB system than with the UB system (see ￿gure 5).
In this case, we would have to increase the lifetime consumption of a young agent at the time of
implementation of the EDB system by 0:14% for her to be as well o⁄ as with the implementation
of the UB system. To make a young agent as well o⁄ in the steady-state of the economy with
the EDB system as in the steady-state of the economy with the UB system, we would have to
increase her lifetime consumption by 0:3%. As a reference note that for the initial young to be as
well o⁄ with the implementation of the UB system as in the steady-state without social security
we would need to increase her lifetime consumption by 3%; while the compensation that would
make young agents as well o⁄ in the long-run would be 7:82%. Although, these welfare costs of
adopting an EDB system instead of an UB system are small they correspond to a relevant share,
about 4:7% and 3:84%; of the cost of adopting an UB social security system. More importantly
they are bigger than the welfare gains associated with the reduction in tax distortions obtained in
16partial equilibrium. The welfare losses due to the general equilibrium e⁄ects of the EDB system
relatively to the UB system are about twice the size of the gains associated with the reduction in
tax distortions measured in section 5.1.1 in the short-run, and about three times the size of those
gains in the long-run.
Furthermore, while the impact on after-tax wages is more negative with the EDB system, the
impact on the rate of return is more positive (see ￿gure 4 panel d). Consequently, in the short-run,
agents that have accumulated a signi￿cant amount of assets bene￿t more from an EDB system.
In fact, while young agents are worse o⁄ with the EDB system because of the higher decrease in
after-tax wages it generates, we can see in ￿gure (5) that all remaining initial generations are better
o⁄ with the EDB system (this will be crucial when we endogenize the size of the systems).
So, relatively to an UB system, the EDB system reduces the distortionary e⁄ect of social security
taxation, but it can also increase the negative impact that social security has on wage rates. In
the benchmark economy, the latter e⁄ect is present and is stronger than the ￿rst; consequently
the EDB system makes current young and future agents worse o⁄ than with the comparable UB
system.5
As we increase the social security tax rate, its distortionary e⁄ect increases exponentially and
gains a relatively higher importance in the comparison between the two systems. For the benchmark
calibration, current young and future agents are worse o⁄ with an UB system corresponding to a
tax superior to 27% than with the comparable EDB system. Therefore, a considerable tax rate is
necessary for the EDB system to generate a reduction in the tax distortion large enough to o⁄set
its general equilibrium e⁄ects.
5In the only other work, to my knowledge, that presents a welfare comparison of the two systems, Auerbach
and Kotliko⁄ (1987) ￿nd e¢ ciency gains from establishing a link between an agent￿ s contributions and bene￿ts in a
standard overlapping generations model calibrated to match the U.S. economy. In their model, the level of capital
is higher in the long-run under the EDB system and outweighs the e⁄ect of the increase in labor supply on wages.
Their 60 overlapping generations model is a ￿ner representation of the demographic structure of the economy, but
the experiments are not similar. Auerbach and Kotliko⁄ (1987) compare systems where the present value of the
￿ ow of bene￿ts paid over 15 retirement periods is a ￿xed percentage of the average lifetime labor income, while I
compare systems that deliver the same level of bene￿ts. More importantly, the point of this section is to show, in a
realistic economic environment, that the welfare impact of linking bene￿ts to earnings might not be positive as it is
commonly perceived. The choice of a simpler generational structure is made to reduce the burden of computing the
politico-economic equilibrium, the main focus of the paper.
175.1.2 Intragenerational Heterogeneity
I now compare the systems in an environment where agents within each generation can di⁄er in
their labor e¢ ciency levels. I set the replacement rate of the UB system so that it delivers a tax
rate of 9:4%, and choose the sequence of replacement rates for the EDB system such that average
social security bene￿ts are the same as with the UB system along the equilibrium path.
Partial Equilibria: In the presence of intragenerational heterogeneity an UB system implies
some redistribution from high to low earners, with high earners contributing signi￿cantly more
than low earners and receiving the same bene￿ts, while the EDB does not imply any direct intra-
generational redistribution. Although the EDB system reduces the distortionary e⁄ect of the tax
on labor, agents with lower labor e¢ ciency are better o⁄ with the UB system than with the EDB
system and agents with higher labor e¢ ciency are better o⁄ with the EDB system than with the
UB system (see ￿gure 6). As in the economy with intragenerational homogeneity, the EDB results
in lower tax rates and in a higher supply of labor as well as a slightly lower accumulation of physical
capital. Notice however that, in contrast with the previous case, the average lifetime utility level is
higher with the UB system than with the EDB system (see ￿gure 7). The gains from redistributing
resources in the UB system from high productivity agents to low productivity agents, that enjoy
less consumption and hence have higher marginal utilities of consumption, outweighs the e¢ ciency
gains associated with the EDB system.
We would have to increase the ￿lifetime consumption of the average young￿ at the time of
implementation of the EDB system by 1:88% for her to be as well o⁄as with the implementation of
the UB system6. As a reference note that for the ￿average initial young￿to be as well o⁄ with the
implementation of the UB system as in the steady-state without social security we would need to
increase her ￿lifetime consumption￿by 1:9%. The values are the same for the comparisons across
steady-states.
Finally, all but the least e¢ cient current and future young are worse o⁄ with both systems (see
￿gure 6). Current old are better o⁄ with both systems while the middle-aged are worse o⁄ with
both systems with the exception of some of the low skilled middle-aged that can be better o⁄ with
6The values are computed by applying the compensating variation formula described in equation (19) to the
average lifetime utilities of the young. The resulting variation is not relatively to the average consumption of the
young but to a consumption stream that would generate the average level of lifetime utility. This measure captures
the relative impact of the social security systems on the average levels of utility.
18the UB system.
General Equilibria: Once we allow prices to adjust, the aggregate response of the economy is
identical to the case with intragenerational homogeneity. Because of the relatively higher labor
supply and lower capital accumulation the wages are lower in the equilibrium with the EDB system.
As a result net wages are lower which makes agents worse o⁄. However, in contrast with the
previous case, in the presence of intragenerational heterogeneity the general equilibrium e⁄ects
seem to diminish the negative impact of the EDB system relatively to the UB system(see ￿gure 9).
We would have to increase the ￿lifetime consumption of the average young￿ at the time of
implementation of the EDB system by 1:52% for her to be as well o⁄as with the implementation of
the UB system. To make the average young as well o⁄in the steady-state of the economy with the
EDB system as in the steady-state of the economy with the UB system, we would have to increase
her ￿lifetime consumption￿by 1:6%. When compared to the corresponding values from the partial
equilibrium analysis, these results indicate that the general equilibrium e⁄ects reduce the welfare
losses of the EDB system relatively to the UB system.
As in the economy with intragenerational homogeneity, the higher decrease in wages with the
EDB system increases the negative impact of the EDB system relatively to the UB system. Only
the three wealthiest types of current and future young are better o⁄ with the EDB than with the
UB system (see ￿gure 8). However, the decrease in the wage rate not only reduces the value of an
individual￿ s human capital but also implies that, for given levels of labor supplied, relatively less is
distributed from more skilled workers to less skilled workers with the UB system. Moreover, while
the aggregate e⁄ective labor supply decreases, the decrease in the e⁄ective labor supplied by more
skilled workers is higher. Therefore, the redistributive features of the UB system are weaker than
in partial equilibrium which decreases the welfare bene￿ts of the UB system relatively to the EDB
system.
An additional consequence of the decrease in the intragenerational redistribution associated
with the UB system is that, in general equilibrium even the least e¢ cient young agents are worse
o⁄ with both systems in the long-run.
As we increase the social security tax rate, its distortionary e⁄ect increases exponentially and
gains a relatively higher importance in the comparison between the two systems. For the benchmark
19calibration, agents are worse o⁄in the long-run with an UB system corresponding to a tax superior
to 37:7% than with the comparable EDB system.
5.2 Politico-economic Equilibria
In this section, I study the welfare impact of implementing a social security system when agents
choose the corresponding replacement rate given that bene￿ts are either earnings-dependent or
universal.
I start by showing that voters￿preferences over the policy parameters are single-peaked. I then
locate the median voter and determine the equilibrium levels of the replacement rates.
5.2.1 Intragenerational Homogeneity
In ￿gure 10, we can see the lifetime utility of agents alive in the period when social security
is implemented over the policy parameters ￿ (EDB) and ￿ (UB). In this economy, preferences
are clearly single peaked over the policy parameters. Older agents prefer higher levels of the
replacement rate, and the utilities of the two oldest generations are strictly increasing over the
depicted levels of the replacement rates. On the other hand, young agents prefer that no social
security system be implemented and their utility is strictly decreasing with the replacement rates.
Hence, the median voter is an age-2 agent which has interior peaks for the policy parameters.
The equilibrium levels of the policy parameters are those that maximize the lifetime utility of
the median voter: ￿￿ = 0:2892 and ￿￿ = 0:1902. In steady-state these replacement rates correspond
respectively to a tax rate on labor income of ￿￿ = 0:0638 and ￿￿ = 0:0433. Therefore the economy
with an EDB social security system has a higher contribution rate than the one with an UB system.
Figure 11 shows the levels of several aggregate variables for the equilibrium paths with the
chosen replacement rates (￿ = ￿￿, ￿ = 0 and ￿ = ￿￿, ￿ = 0).
We observe that tax rates are signi￿cantly higher for the social security system with EDB than
for the one with UB (see ￿gure 11 panel e); when voters choose social security bene￿ts, the median
voter prefers a signi￿cantly larger social security system when bene￿ts are earnings-dependent.
Additionally, while both systems decrease welfare, current young and future agents are worse o⁄ in
the equilibrium with EDB (see ￿gure 12).
Although the present value of net bene￿ts for the median voter is lower with an earnings-
20dependent system than with a comparable UB system, its general equilibrium e⁄ects are more
favorable to the median voter and older agents7. As we saw in section 5.1.1, the EDB system
generates a higher supply of labor and lower accumulation of capital along the equilibrium path
than a comparable UB system. Because of the response of the labor supply, in the initial period
the wage rate increases by slightly less in the EDB system. Thereafter the interest rate increases
and the wage rate decreases considerably more in the EDB equilibrium. The augmented impact on
the interest rate generates an increased support for social security by agents that have accumulated
capital, and the median voter is enticed to vote for a bigger social security system when she is
choosing over levels of earnings-dependent bene￿ts.
Moreover, in an universal system the social security bene￿ts the median voter will receive upon
retirement are linked to the future supply of labor, which decreases with the replacement rate,
while in the EDB system, her bene￿ts are proportional to her lifetime earnings, which are much
less responsive to changes in the replacement rate. This e⁄ect increases the incentive to choose
higher replacement rates in the latter case.
Finally, as we saw in the previous section, an EDB system can lead to higher welfare losses
than a comparable UB system for the initial young and all future generations. As the median
voter chooses a relatively bigger EDB system, those agents are much worse o⁄with an EDB system
when we allow the size of the systems to be chosen in a democratic voting process. We would
have to increase the lifetime consumption of a young agent at the time of implementation of the
EDB system by 0:84% for her to be as well o⁄ as with the implementation of the UB system.
To make a young agent as well o⁄ in the steady-state of the economy with the EDB system as
in the steady-state of the economy with the UB system, we would have to increase her lifetime
consumption by 1:93%. So once we endogenize the size of the social security system, the welfare
cost of opting for an EDB system is very signi￿cant. Note that the welfare cost for the young of
an UB system relatively to the steady-state without social security is 1:24% in the short-run and
3:41% in the long-run.
In ￿gures 12 and 10 it is clear that the three oldest initial generations are better o⁄ in the
politico-equilibrium achieved with an EDB system (￿ = ￿￿, ￿ = 0), than in the equilibrium achieved
7The results in this environment are similar to Cooley and Soares (1999) where, although the present value of net
bene￿ts of social security are negative for the median voter, the general equilibrium e⁄ects of social security on the
utility of agents, through its impact on factor prices, are important and generate support for positive levels of social
security.
21with an UB system (￿ = ￿￿, ￿ = 0). So, if we allowed for the choice of systems before agents
would vote on the corresponding parameters, an EDB system would be chosen over an UB system
which would make agents worse o⁄ in the long-run.
5.2.2 Intragenerational Heterogeneity
In ￿gures 13-16, we can see that the preferences of agents alive in the period when social security
is implemented are single peaked over the policy parameters ￿ (EDB) and ￿ (UB).
The preferences of nearly all agents in the two oldest generations are strictly increasing over
the depicted range of the replacement rates as their contributions are low and bene￿ts are large
(see ￿gures 15 and 16). However, in the UB system individual￿ s contributions increase with their
skills while their bene￿ts remain constant. Therefore while the level of the UB replacement rate
preferred by the middle-aged is positive it decreases with their skill level. We observe a peak in the
preferences of the more skilled middle-aged over the UB replacement rate, as they pay a relative
high level of taxes for the bene￿ts received, with the most skilled middle-aged preferring very low
levels of social security in the UB system.
On the other hand, the preferences of nearly every young are strictly decreasing with the
replacement rates (see ￿gure 13) and they prefer that no social security system be implemented.
The exception are the less skilled young who bene￿t enough from the redistribution associated
with the UB system and consequently support a non-trivial level of the corresponding replacement
rate. The less skilled age-2 agents together with the older generations prefer higher levels of the
UB system parameter, Hence, the median voter is a type-6 age-2 agent which has interior peaks
for the policy parameter.
Finally, within any given cohort, while more skilled agents prefer a smaller UB system than less
skilled agents, the ranking of preferences over the size of the EDB system is independent of the
skill level.
As we saw in section 5.1.2, the intragenerational distribution features of the UB system are
dominant and favor the median voter, increasing her incentive to choose higher replacement rates
in an UB system than in an EDB system. As a result, the median voter prefers a signi￿cantly
larger social security system when bene￿ts are universal. The equilibrium levels of the policy
parameters are ￿￿ = 0:3005 and ￿￿ = 0:4147. In steady-state these replacement rates correspond
22respectively to a tax rate on labor income of ￿￿ = 0:0663 and ￿￿ = 0:0944. Therefore the economy
with an UB social security system has a higher contribution rate than one with an EDB system.
Figure 17 shows the levels of the main aggregate variables for the equilibrium paths with the
chosen replacement rates (￿ = ￿￿, ￿ = 0 and ￿ = ￿￿, ￿ = 0). It is clear that the larger equilibrium
UB system has a stronger impact on the aggregate variables. The levels of capital and labor are
lower in the equilibrium with the UB system and the wage rate increases by more in the short-run
and then sinks deeper in the long-run, with the interest rate following the opposite pattern. Given
that tax rates are signi￿cantly higher in the equilibrium with UB than in the equilibrium with
EDB, the decrease of the net wage rate is much higher with the UB system. Consequently, in
the long-run agents are on average worse o⁄ when the system is UB (see ￿gure 19). To make
the average young agent as well o⁄ in the steady-state of the economy with the EDB system as
in the steady-state of the economy with the UB system, we would have to decrease her ￿lifetime
consumption￿by 0:79%. So when we endogenize the size of the social security system, the welfare
cost of opting for an UB system is very signi￿cant. Notice that the welfare cost for the ￿average
young￿of an UB system relatively to the steady-state without social security is 6:47% in the long-
run. Moreover, in the long-run, all agents except the ones in the two lowest skill groups are worse
o⁄ with the UB system (see ￿gure 18); the lowest skilled agents still bene￿t from the redistribution
associated with this system.
However, on average the current young are better o⁄in the equilibrium with UB (see ￿gure 19).
We would have to increase the ￿lifetime consumption of the average young agent￿at the time of
implementation of the EDB system by 0:57% for her to be as well o⁄ as with the implementation
of the UB system. The welfare cost for the ￿average young￿at the time of implementation of an
UB system relatively to the steady-state without social security is 1:61%.
Because the system is bigger and implies more intergenerational redistribution all initial old and
middle-aged, except the more skilled ones, are better o⁄ with the UB system, non-withstanding
its highest initial negative impact on the interest rate (see ￿gure 18). On the other hand, age-2
agents preferences are equally distributed across systems with the less skilled half preferring the
UB system and the most skilled half faring better with the EDB system. Finally most initially
living younger generations prefer the smaller EDB system. Given the resulting larger decrease of
wage rates after the implementation period with the UB system, only the three lowest skill groups
23among the young gain enough from its intragenerational distributional features to prefer the UB
system over the EDB system. Consequently, if we allowed for the choice of systems before agents
would vote on the corresponding parameters, an UB system would be chosen over an EDB system
which would make most agents worse o⁄ in the long-run.
246 Summary of ￿ndings
6.1 Economic Equilibria
6.1.1 Intragenerational Homogeneity
Partial Equilibria In an environment where factor prices remain unchanged, an EDB social
security system that delivers the same bene￿ts as the benchmark UB system results in a decrease
of the deadweight loss associated with the tax on labor income, and also in a lower tax rate.
Consequently, the welfare of current and future young is higher under the EDB system.
General Equilibria In general equilibrium, as the labor supply is larger and savings are lower
under the EDB system than under the UB system, the after tax wage rate is lower. Consequently,
the welfare of current and future young is higher under the UB system.
6.1.2 Intragenerational Heterogeneity
Partial Equilibria: In the presence of intragenerational skill heterogeneity, when factor prices
remain unchanged, although the EDB system results in less distortion and lower tax rates, the
redistributional features of the UB system imply that agents with lower skills are better o⁄ with
the UB system than with the EDB system, and agents with higher skills are better o⁄ with the
EDB system than with the UB system. On average current and future young are better o⁄ with
the UB system than with the EDB system.
General Equilibria In the presence of intragenerational heterogeneity the general equilibrium
e⁄ects diminish the negative impact of the EDB system relatively to the UB system. The higher
decrease in wages with the EDB system increases the negative impact of the EDB system relatively
to the UB system. However the decrease in the wage rate and the higher reduction in the e⁄ective
labor supplied by more skilled workers implies that an UB system redistributes less from more
skilled workers to less skilled workers. Therefore, the redistributive features of the UB system are
weaker than in partial equilibrium which decreases the welfare bene￿ts of the UB system relatively
to the EDB system.
256.2 Politico-economic Equilibria
6.2.1 Intragenerational Homogeneity
When we let agents choose the size of the social security systems in an environment with intra-
generational homogeneity, the median voter, an age-2 agent, prefers a signi￿cantly larger system
under an EDB system than under an UB system. While both systems decrease welfare, current
and future young are worse o⁄ in the politico-economic equilibrium with an EDB system.
If we allow for the choice of systems before agents vote on the corresponding parameters, the
EDB system is chosen over the UB system which would make agents worse o⁄ in the long-run..
6.2.2 Intragenerational Heterogeneity
When agents choose the size of the social security systems in an environment with intragenerational
skill heterogeneity, the median voter, a type-6 age-2 agent, prefers a larger social security system
when bene￿ts are universal. In the long-run, agents are on average worse o⁄ when the system
is UB, with all agents except the ones in the two lowest skill groups being worse o⁄ with the UB
system. However, on average the current young are better o⁄ when the equilibrium UB system is
implemented.
If we allow for the choice of systems before agents vote on the corresponding parameters, the
UB system would be chosen over the EDB system which would make most agents worse o⁄ in the
long-run.
267 Concluding Remarks
A pure earnings-dependent bene￿ts system is commonly perceived as being more e¢ cient than an
universal bene￿ts system because it reduces the distortions inherent to a tax on labor income and
the corresponding deadweight losses. In this paper, I build an overlapping generations environment
with intragenerational homogeneity which underscores the positive features of earnings-dependent
bene￿ts systems, and therefore predisposes the model to deliver results favorable to this system
relatively to a comparable universal bene￿ts system. I ￿nd that the current young and future
generations can be better o⁄ in an economy with an universal bene￿ts system than in an economy
with a comparable earnings-dependent bene￿ts system. The earnings-dependent bene￿t system
generates a much lower decrease in labor supply and a somewhat higher decrease in savings. In
general equilibrium, the disparity in the impact on the supply of labor and on capital accumu-
lation implies that net wages can be signi￿cantly lower and, therefore, agents can be worse o⁄
with an earnings-dependent system than with a comparable universal system. Once I introduce
intragenerational heterogeneity, as expected, the results are mostly driven by the intragenerational
distribution features of the UB system that increase average levels of utility by redistributing re-
sources from wealthier agents with lower marginal utility of consumption to less skilled and poorer
agents with higher marginal bene￿ts of consumption. Moreover, the general equilibrium e⁄ects are
such that, only the most skilled groups are better o⁄with the EDB system than with a comparable
UB system.
If we allow agents to choose social security bene￿ts in a majority voting process, in the economy
with intragenerational homogeneity, the median voter prefers a signi￿cantly larger social security
system when bene￿ts are earnings-dependent. Consequently, agents are considerably worse o⁄,
in the short-run and in the long-run, when bene￿ts are earnings-dependent than when they are
universal. As in Cooley and Soares (1999), the general equilibrium e⁄ects are determinant. An
earnings-dependent bene￿ts system generates a higher supply of labor and lower accumulation of
capital along the equilibrium path than a comparable universal bene￿ts system. The consequent
bigger impact on interest rates increases the support for social security by the median voter who
bene￿ts from the increase in future labor income. In the economy with intragenerational hetero-
geneity, the median voter is the top of the bottom half of the skill distribution among her cohort
and prefers a larger social security system when bene￿ts are universal. The larger size of this
27system, leads to a bigger decrease of the wage rate in the long-run which makes all but the two
least skilled groups of agents worse o⁄ than with an earnings-dependent system. However, agents
are on average better o⁄ in the short-run when bene￿ts are universal.
Interestingly, if we would allow for the choice of systems before agents would vote on the
corresponding parameters, the system that would be chosen would be the one that makes most
agents worse o⁄ in the long-run.
This paper does not take into account some features that might relevant for the comparison of
these two social security systems. In particular, I do not allow for idiosyncratic nor aggregate shocks
which are important in the analysis of a social security program. For instance, the introduction
of uninsurable idiosyncratic individual shocks might reinforce the impact of an universal bene￿ts
system and the presence of cohort speci￿c shocks might possibly improve the welfare impact of an
earnings-dependent bene￿ts system.
Despite these limitations, this paper stresses the importance of considering the general equilib-
rium e⁄ects and specially the politico-economic equilibrium impact of introducing changes to the
structure of the social security system.
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30A Tables and Graphs
Table 1 - Calibration
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ n
0:881 5:1 0:358 0:64 0:7137 0:203
31Table 2 - Welfare Measures
Short-run Long-run
Universal Earnings-Dependent Universal Earnings-Dependent
Bene￿ts Bene￿ts Bene￿ts Bene￿ts
Economic Equilibria - Comparable systems
Intragenerational Homogeneity
Compensating variation 3:96%8 3:81%9 3:96%10 3:81%11
partial equilibrium ￿0:14%12 ￿0:14%13
Compensating variation 3% 3:15% 7:82% 8:14%
general equilibrium 0:14% 0:3%
Intragenerational Heterogeneity14
Compensating variation 1:9% 3:82% 1:9% 3:82%
partial equilibrium 1:88% 1:88%
Compensating variation 1:6% 3:15% 6:43% 8:14%
general equilibrium 1:52% 1:6%
Politico-economic equilibria
Intragenerational Homogeneity
Replacement rate 0:1902 0:2892 0:1902 0:2892
Tax rate 0:0433 0:0648 0:0433 0:0638
Compensating variation 1:24% 2:1% 3:41% 5:41%
0:84% 1:93%
Intragenerational Heterogeneity
Replacement rate 0:4147 0:3005 0:4147 0:3005
Tax rate 0:0944 0:0674 0:0944 0:0663
Compensating variation 1:61% 2:19% 6:47% 5:63%
0:57% ￿0:79%
8Percentual increase in the lifetime consumption of a young agent born at the time of implementation of
the UB social security system necessary for her to be as well o⁄ as in the economy without social security.
9Percentual increase in the lifetime consumption of a young agent born at the time of implementation of
the EDB social security system necessary for her to be as well o⁄ as in the economy without social security.
10Percentual increase in the lifetime consumption of a young agent born in the steady-state of the economy
with the UB system necessary for her to be as well o⁄ as if she was born in the steady-state of the economy
without social security.
11Percentual increase in the lifetime consumption of a young agent born in the steady-state of the economy
with the EDB system necessary for her to be as well o⁄as if she was born in the steady-state of the economy
without social security.
12Percentual increase in the lifetime consumption of a young agent born at the time of implementation of
the EDB social security system necessary for her to be as well o⁄as with the implementation of a cimparable
UB system.
13Percentual increase in the lifetime consumption of a young agent born in the steady-state of the economy
with the EDB system necessary for her to be as well o⁄as if she was born in the steady-state of the economy
with a comparable UB system.
14See footnote 6.











































































Figure 1: Variables along partial equilibrium path for comparable social security systems


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Replacement rates Universal Benefits
Earnings-Dependent Benefits
Figure 10: Lifetime utilities of period 1 agents for di⁄erent values of the replacement rates




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This appendix describes the procedure used to compute the equilibria described in the paper.
The procedure involves solving for the competitive equilibrium path for a given level of the
policy parameters.
I then evaluate how agents fare under di⁄erent sequences of the policy parameters and then
￿nd the level of the policy parameter that maximizes the utility of the ￿rst period median voter.
B.1 The Competitive Equilibrium Path
The equilibrium paths are computed using the following algorithm:
1. I start by computing the initial state of the economy (A0;E0):
2. I then set the set of replacement rates, ￿, which will remain constant along the equilibrium
path.
3. I make an initial guess for the equilibrium path for the state of the economy and for the labor
supply fA;E;Lg0. Given this path, the levels of all the remaining endogenous variables
along the path can be determined, including aggregate capital stock, fKg0; aggregate labor
supply, factor prices, social security bene￿ts, taxes, and ￿ijt (see equation 18).
4. I can then use the optimality conditions for problem (10) to calculate the decisions of agents
along the path, ci;j;li;j;a0
i+1;j;e0
i+1;j.
5. Once we get to the individual decisions along the path, we can compute the implied path for
state of the economy and for the labor supply fA;E;Lg1.
6. Finally, we compare the corresponding path for the aggregate capital stock, fKg1 to the one
obtained from the initial guess, fKg0.
7. If the new path is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the initial path we update the initial guess in
step 3 and repeat steps 3-7.
8. Otherwise, an equilibrium path has been found.
B.2 The Implemented Social Security Tax Rate
We know describe how we use this procedure to determine the level of the replacement rate that
will be implemented in the initial period.
1. I start by computing the initial state of the economy (A0;E0):
￿ I de￿ne a grid for the replacement rate that is being voted on.
52￿ Then, I compute the competitive equilibrium path fA;E;Lg corresponding to each re-
placement rate (see the previous section of the Appendix).
￿ I obtain the lifetime utility levels of agents living in the initial period for each level of
the replacement rate: Vi(xi;X;￿)
￿ I check for single-peakedness of preferences and locate the median voter.
2. Once the median voter is located I search for the level of the replacement rate that maximizes
her lifetime utility, around the peak found in the initial grid.
￿ Notice that in order to do this, I need to compute the competitive equilibrium path for
each level of the replacement rate.
53